After the Velvet Revolution, the 44-day war, and the dearminazation of Artsakh, at this stage of Armenia’s “Western” aspirations, there is a considerable discussion regarding parallels between Armenia and Georgia. In particular, Armenia’s adoption of a European path in the example of Georgia, and the shift in the Russian “vector” alongside comparisons drawn between these processes.
At first glance, it’s tempting and easy to draw parallels between these two experiences: both countries have witnessed democratic movements, replacing entrenched, clientelist, and corrupt authorities with new actors advocating dynamic, flexible, and people-friendly populism filled with promises.
As they have assumed power, they have promptly turned on the “disk” of nationalism. Specifically, in Georgia’s case, the focus has been on the return of lost territories, Abkhazia and Ossetia, under the direct control of Georgia. In Armenia, the emphasis has been on maintaining the de-facto status quo in Artsakh, accompanied by appropriate slogans and appeals.
Both Pashinyan and Saakashvili came to power through post-election, non-violent street struggles, aimed at reforming the corrupt authorities and addressing falsified and stolen from people elections. These movements resulted in the resignation of existing leaders — Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in one case, and Serj Sargsyan in the other — followed by a smooth transition of power.
Both Pashinyan and Saakashvili provided unannounced assurances to the acting presidents and acquired power with their indirect backing.
On the other hand, neither Pashinyan nor Saakashvili were “outsiders” rather, they were active and enduring players within their respective political systems. Both had established their own parties and emerged as influential politicians in their capital cities. Furthermore, both strengthened their positions through street struggle and powerful rhetoric.
Saakashvili served as the Minister of Justice in Shevardnadze’s government, while Pashinyan led the main opposition alliance in the parliament elected in 2017. While Pashinyan cautiously and moderately talked about potential changes to national symbols such as the anthem, coat of arms, and flag after assuming office, Saakashvili swiftly took action. Shortly after his inauguration, Saakashvili initiated changes to the anthem, flag, and coat of arms.
Moreover, Saakashvili facilitated the return of the remains of Zviad Gamsakhurdia from Chechnya. Gamsakhurdia, the exiled first president of Georgia, was an advocate of Georgian nationalism and territorial integrity. He was also the defeated president of the first Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian wars. Additionally, Saakashvili named one of the main streets after Gamsakhurdia.
Simultaneously, Saakashvili compelled Aslan Abashidze, the local “king” of Adjara, to resign and suppressed the decentralized aspirations of the region. Furthermore, he decisively pursued Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s vision of unifying South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which had maintained autonomy from Tbilisi since the 1990s war and had been conducting pro-Russian policies.
In contrast to Nikol Pashinyan, who advocated for preserving the status quo of the regional conflict with nationalist and populist slogans such as “Artsakh is Armenia and that’s it” alongside maintaining a constructive facade through the “imitation” of negotiations, while continuing Serj Sargsyan’s inertial politics and personnel legacy in the economic dimension, Saakashvili was a true revolutionary in economics.
He bolstered his nationalist rhetoric and the image of a reformer and unifier of Georgia through drastic and productive economic reforms, including implementing a strict tax policy and waging an uncompromising struggle against criminality, bribery, and clan systems. Despite facing challenges such as the global economic crisis, the defeat in the Russian-Georgian war, and hosting thousands of refugees, Georgia experienced significant and impressive decade-long economic growth, marked by a notable 12.5% rise in GDP in 2007 and 2008.
Both Pashinyan and Saakashvili, rising to power through popular movements and with the promise of building a civil society, immediately became preoccupied with nationalism, populism, and the promotion of powerful and united Armenia/ Georgia. Furthermore, achieving minor victories, such as the “July Victories” and the “Abkhazian Crisis”, and striving to change, in the Armenian case to keep the status quo, both moved against the interests of the regional superpower, Russia.
As a result, both were defeated: one in the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russian tanks reached the outskirts of Tbilisi, and the other during the 2020 44-day war, when the Azerbaijani army achieved a devastating victory with the subsequent phased absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Initially, both Pashinyan and Saakashvili positioned themselves as supporters of a multi-vector policy and advocates of amicable relations with the West, Russia, and their neighbors.
In contrast to Armenia, which both prior to Pashinyan’s election and afterward spoke about the preservation of the foreign vector as well as the indispensability and key importance of Russian and Armenian relations, Saakashvili’s Georgia obviously strived towards the EU, spoke about European integration, and aimed to deepen ties with the USA and NATO.
Saakashvili was defeated, unable to subjugate Abkhazia and Ossetia. He became a victim of Russia’s tough and unexpected response, realizing the impossibility of altering the Black Sea status quo against Russia. The case of Pashinyan was the opposite but followed a similar logic.
Pashinyan aimed to uphold the national narrative and maintain the existing Artsakh-Armenia status quo, leading him to oppose the “Lavrov Plan” advocated by Russia. However, he suffered defeat, finding himself isolated and without allies against Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Similarly, Georgia, assuming it would receive support in changing the status quo, found itself isolated during the war. Only the direct threats from the USA prevented Russia from conquering Tbilisi and pushing back the Ossetian-Abkhazian and their troops to their initial positions.
Both Saakashvili’s Georgia and Pashinyan’s Armenia, succumbing to tempting populism, radical nationalism, and adventurous foreign policies, were punished by Russia: one for attempting to change the status quo, and the other for its efforts to maintain it.
In both cases, Russia was unable to forgive the “newcomers” who came to power through legitimate means and challenged the empire’s role as a regional arbiter. Moreover, in both instances, they managed to maintain their power and strengthen their positions after the lost wars through economic growth and improvements in people’s well-being. Additionally, they achieved this by concurrently reinforcing, expanding, and preserving their person-centered power.
Gor Madoyan