In 2011, the almost agreed-upon document was not signed in Kazan. The expert and political community spoke about the exhaustion of the mediators’ imagination.
After one year, parliamentary elections took place in Armenia, followed by presidential elections in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2013, Ilham Aliyev was elected president for the third time.
At the beginning of his first term in office, in April 2004, he traveled to Warsaw for a meeting with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan. He was accompanied by the Defense Minister, who held a separate meeting with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. During this meeting, the Minister announced that Azerbaijan would “never reconcile” with the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Aliyev’s third term in office was marked by unprecedented tension along the entire line of contact, reaching its peak in November 2014 when an Armenian helicopter conducting a training flight was shot down near Aghdam. This incident occurred three months after a meeting between Vladimir Putin, Serzh Sargsyan, and Ilham Aliyev in Sochi.
These negotiations revolved around the so-called “postponed referendum” principle suggested by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs within the framework of peace talks. Ilham Aliyev rejected the possibility of conducting a separate referendum on the status after the withdrawal of troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. The April 2016 battles essentially constituted an ultimatum from Baku. It is not known how or through what agreements those battles ceased.
Thus, the Second Karabakh war began with the crisis tension of the summer-autumn of 2014. When, in 2017, the Armenian National Congress “did not overcome the passing threshold” in the parliamentary elections of Armenia, and a constitutional referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh in parallel with Bako Sahakyan being elected as the Speaker of the National Assembly for the third term, it became almost obvious that the war, as they say, “breathes down our necks”.
The transition from a presidential to a parliamentary government in Armenia was explained by many experts through the “Collective Responsibility” principle. This principle was expected to be supported by Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, alongside the political consensus formed by Bako Sahakyan, where the local structure of the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) played an influential role.
The option discussed for the regulation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2017-2018 is commonly referred to as the “Lavrov Plan.” In brief, it proposed the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the surrounding areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, and adjustments to the geographical parameters of the Lachin Corridor.
After the four-day fighting in April 2016, President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan told the Nagorno-Karabakh political elite that the alternative to not returning the territories was the resumption of war, with a high possibility of mourning for Stepanakert instead of Kars.
In this situation, the “velvet, non-violent revolution” took place. How and why did Nikol Pashinyan come to power? Serzh Sargsyan stated that he was defeated not by Pashinyan, but by internal and external influential forces. Pashinyan has not yet talked about the underlying motives and goals behind his rise to power; he continues to publicly assert that he has fulfilled the will of the people. His political opponents and rivals argue that “Pashinyan has been brought in by foreign forces to hand over Artsakh”.
It is noteworthy that in the first days of June 2018, when Arayik Harutyunyan resigned from the post of State Minister, protests were taking place in Stepanakert. Pashinyan openly supported Bako Sahakyan and declared that “the revolution should not reach Artsakh.” For two years, from 2018 to 2020, there were no contradictions between Nikol Pashinyan and Nagorno-Karabakh’s authorities and political elite. The resignations of Levon Mnatsakanyan and Vitaly Balasanyan from the positions of Commander of the Army of Defense and Secretary of the Security Council respectively took place. However, Levon Mnatsakanyan was appointed as the Chief of Police, and Vitaly Balasanyan was replaced by Arshavir Gharamyan.
The political novelty or intrigue in Nagorno-Karabakh was manifested in the summer of 2019 when the former commander of the Army of Defense, Samvel Babayan, initiated a petition to amend the Constitution, aiming to allow his participation in the presidential elections. Babayan successfully mobilized an inspiring team of supporters and sympathizers, with approximately 25,000 eligible voters joining the process. However, the Constitutional Court of the Supreme Court declared the proposed amendment unconstitutional. Consequently, Babayan founded the “United Motherland” party with the determination to participate in the parliamentary elections and form a majority.
In the political and state life of Nagorno-Karabakh, the presidential elections of 2020 were unprecedented in terms of the nomination and registration of candidates. More than ten people were competing for the position of president. Moreover, up until the end, it was not clear which of the main competitors, Arayik Harutyunyan and Masis Mayilyan, was supported by Yerevan in the person of Nikol Pashinyan and his “Civil Contract” party. Bako Sahakyan’s attitude was also intriguing, as he never showed any indication of who his successor might be.
There was an impression that everything was pre-planned, so that Arayik Harutyunyan would not win in the first round of the elections. The decision of who should lead Nagorno-Karabakh would be determined through internal and, notably, external political “examination” of the two candidates who received the highest number of votes.
Shortly before the second round of voting, Masis Mayilian announced that he leaves the electoral contest. Afterward, Arayik Harutyunyan failed to secure a political majority. His bloc received 16 parliamentary mandates, while Samvel Babayan’s party received 9. Out of the remaining 8 mandates, 3 each went to the ARF local structure and the “Justice” party sponsored by Vitaly Balasanyan, and 2 to the Democratic Party of Artsakh led by the former long-time speaker of the National Assembly, Ashot Ghulyan.
The weakest authority in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh was established. A political coalition between Arayik Harutyunyan’s “Free Motherland-UCA” alliance and Samvel Babayan’s “United Motherland” party was not formed. Babayan was appointed as the Secretary of the National Security Council and attempted to establish a “Control” body.
He received that opportunity, but on September 27, Ilham Aliyev gave the order for a large-scale attack. The war resumed in a situation where there was turbulence in Stepanakert, with all its manifestations, first of all, the lack of rightful political leadership of the Defense Army.
To date, it is not clear what was the need to declare martial law in Armenia on September 27, 2020. Formally, Azerbaijan initiated military actions within its internationally recognized borders. Additionally, the reason why Arayik Harutyunyan’s decree declaring martial law in Nagorno-Karabakh has not been published till today remains a mystery as well.
The NKR Law “On Martial Law” defines the content of the presidential decree and requires that it be published and read on television and radio after it is presented to the National Assembly. No such legal act was published.
Hence, the legal responsibility for the war and its consequences remained within the domain of Armenia and Azerbaijan from the outset. Consequently, Armenia and Azerbaijan are the parties to the ceasefire agreement. Nagorno-Karabakh was not a subject of the war and therefore could not be an actor in post-war regulations. The political possibility, wherein Stepanakert could join the ceasefire regime and assume responsibility for its part through the National Assembly’s declaration, was not considered. This, in fact, constituted the second political “mistake” following the non-publication of Arayik Harutyunyan’s decree declaring martial law.
Instead, the thesis “Artsakh will never be a part of Azerbaijan” was circulated in Stepanakert. However, the reality was that Nagorno-Karabakh might or might not continue to exist, a point discussed by Nikol Pashinyan in April 2022. Specifically, during his speech at the National Assembly, the Prime Minister announced “lowering the bar” concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh status and “the possibility of reaching an international consensus” on this approach.
A few days later, Stepanakert responded with a statement unanimously adopted by the National Assembly, where the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations were assessed as a “fake peace agenda”, affirming that the only acceptable status for Nagorno-Karabakh should be outside of Baku’s jurisdiction. Prior to this, the Nagorno-Karabakh Parliament unanimously passed the “Occupied Territories” law, which designates not only the Shushi and Hadrut regions but also all other territories under the control of the Armenian armed forces as of May 12, 1994, as occupied by Azerbaijan.
In 2022, Azerbaijan conducted de facto military operations, reportedly agreed upon with the command of the Russian peacekeeping force, resulting in the capture of Parukh and a part of Qaraglukh, Saribaba, and all prevailing heights along the contact line, as well as the alteration of the Lachin Corridor and displacement of the Armenian population from Aghavno and Sus villages. Subsequently, on December 12, Azerbaijan closed the Stepanakert-Goris highway. Formally, Baku offered Stepanakert a last chance in March 2023, twice at the level of the president’s office, proposing negotiations on “reintegration issues” to Nagorno-Karabakh representatives. Stepanakert declined both times.
Azerbaijan has always had one approach regarding the regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: “If the Armenians of Karabakh are recognized as legal and political subjects, then the Azerbaijanis of Armenia should be afforded the same recognition. If no Azerbaijanis live in Armenia, then no Armenians should live in Azerbaijan either”. The first Karabakh war and subsequent diplomatic achievements disrupted this narrative of Baku. The abandonment of the phased settlement approach, along with the “change of power” in 1998, led to international de-legitimization of the Nagorno-Karabakh as a political entity. The November 9 ceasefire agreement formally and politically affirmed this reality, yet Stepanakert has not taken steps to engage in political discussions regarding regulation.
After August 5, 2023, when Azerbaijan de facto revoked the status of the Lachin Corridor, the focus shifted to preserving the Armenian identity in Nagorno-Karabakh or relocating 120,000 people to Armenia. Whether discussions regarding this matter occurred between Yerevan and Stepanakert remains unconfirmed. Indeed, ethnic cleansing and the threat of genocide were repeatedly emphasized in Yerevan’s official speeches. On June 14, 2023, Arayik Harutyunyan addressed the UN Secretary-General, the member states of the Security Council, and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, warning of an imminent disaster and urging action.
As a conclusion, it could be argued that just as Baku managed to portray Armenia’s stance as “non-constructive” for more than two decades before the war and to obtain an indulgence to “liberate its internationally recognized territories,” in the two and a half years after the war, Ilham Aliyev has also succeeded in convincing involved actors that “The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh do not wish to live under the flag of Azerbaijan”.
The “Resistance Movement” of Stepanakert has “gifted” Aliyev with such an opportunity. In the created situation, the “safe and dignified evacuation” of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was deemed the least of evils.
It seems that the actors involved, especially the Armenian authorities, believed that the “evacuation” of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh would “overcome the last obstacle to historical reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan”. However, Aliyev’s pre-election interview indicated the opposite. The political impotence of Stepanakert, seemingly facilitated by the government of Armenia, is not and cannot be an instrument for reducing tension, even as a minimal diplomatic resource.
Vahram Atanesyan